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Abstract: Computational Social Science emerged as a highly technical and popular discipline in the last few years, 
owing to the substantial advances in communication technology and daily production of vast quantities of personal 
data. As per capita data production significantly increased in the last decade, both in terms of its size (bytes) as well as 
its detail (heartrate monitors, internet-connected appliances, smartphones), social scientists’ ability to extract 
meaningful social, political and demographic information from digital data also increased. A vast methodological gap 
exists in ‘computational international relations’, which refers to the use of one or a combination of tools such as data 
mining, natural language processing, automated text analysis, web scraping, geospatial analysis and machine learning 
to provide larger and better organized data to test more advanced theories of IR. After providing an overview of the 
potentials of computational IR and how an IR scholar can establish technical proficiency in computer science (such as 
starting with Python, R, QGis, ArcGis or Github), this paper will focus on some of the author’s works in providing 
an idea for IR students on how to think about computational IR. The paper argues that computational methods 
transcend the methodological schism between qualitative and quantitative approaches and form a solid foundation in 
building truly multi-method research design. 
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Introduction –  
What is Computational IR (ComInt)? 
 
Computational International Relations (ComInt1), 
introduced as a specific inquiry of research in this 
paper, derives from the Computational Social Science 
(ComSoc2) revolution of the last decade. International 
relations (IR) literature has long trailed behind political 
science (PolSci) since the seminal Designing Social 
Inquiry3 (DSI) by King, Keohane and Verba. Setting 
the quantitative bounds of the discipline despite its 
evolution over the years, DSI has established the 
methodological orthodoxy of both IR and PolSci, 
becoming the key text in almost all methods classes. 
The showdown of critical and supportive camps over 
DSI has continued well into today, setting the 
parameters of methodological polarization. The strong 
empiricism of regression and statistical modelling was 
challenged by the qualitative camp for a variety of 
reasons, including distortion of analytical focus4, 
manipulation of data5, and overall skepticism over how 
much mathematical validity can imply causality6. This 
long and seemingly unending core debate on 
methodology in IR and PolSci has become eclipsed by 
the advent of computational social science as a meta-
bridge between extreme ends of hard sciences and 
social sciences. 
There is no one single gateway to computational social 
science. It is rather a meeting point between diverse 
disciplines that seek to strengthen their analytical 
                                                
1 I will be abbreviating Computational IR as ComInt, as CIR 
is an over-crowded abbreviation in international relations, 
used in reference to Coordinator for International Relations, 
Central Intelligence Report, Critical Information 
Requirements, CIR Capital Investments Review, among 
many others. 
 
2 I am strongly in favour of abbreviating Computational 
Social Science as ComSoc, because CSS is already over-
crowded with several computer science-related 
terminologies (including ‘computer science’), including 
Cascading Style Sheets, Content Scrambling System, 
Central/Computing Support Services, Core System 
Software, Client Security Software and so on… 
 
3 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, 
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research 
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
4 Christopher H. Achen, “Let’s Put Garbage-Can 
Regressions and Garbage-Can Probits Where They Belong,” 
Conflict Management and Peace Science 22, no. 4 (September 1, 
2005): 327–39, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940500339167; David 
Collier and Henry E. Brady, Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse 
Tools, Shared Standards (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 2004); Philip A. Schrodt, “Beyond the Linear 
Frequentist Orthodoxy,” Political Analysis 14, no. 3 (July 
2006): 335–39, https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpj013. 
5 Frank P. Harvey, “Practicing Coercion: Revisiting 
Successes and Failures Using Boolean Logic and 
Comparative Methods,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, 
no. 6 (1999): 840–71; Peter A. Hall, “Aligning Ontology and 
approach through the use of a wide array of computer 
and data science tools. Although the term used to 
define computer (or other hard) scientists using big 
data processing methods to explain social 
phenomena7, this frame is currently expanding. 
Increasingly more social scientists are getting trained 
in the ways of data science and Internet research, 
harvesting new forms of data to expand some of the 
fundamental assertions of their literature. Training a 
dedicated ‘computational social scientist’ is a 
complicated and broad task, with many definitional 
and operational questions. For example, how can a 
student with no programming or computer 
background start learning computational tools? Which 
exact programming languages should a student 
master? Is it enough to learn coding? How much? 
Once coding yields promising data, should you map it, 
or run a cluster network analysis? Should you learn 
Python or R? Is it better to specialize in geospatial 
research, sentiment analysis, neural networks or data 
mining? The difficulty of answering these questions, 
beyond the fact that such answers are highly 
subjective, lies within the rapidly transforming 
technical environment of computer science. 
 
A Brief History of Computational Social Science (ComSoc) 
 
It is hard to build an accurate trajectory of ComSoc. 
Different social sciences disciplines have adopted, 
dropped, marginalized and re-adopted computer-
based tools at different points since 1980s. Earliest 
forms of Dynamic Systems Theory8 and Artificial 
Methodology in Comparative Research,” in Comparative 
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Cambridge Studies in Comparative 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
373–404 
6 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); 
Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference, 2nd 
edition (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
7 Steven Bankes, Robert Lempert, and Steven Popper, 
“Making Computational Social Science Effective: 
Epistemology, Methodology, and Technology,” Social Science 
Computer Review 20, no. 4 (November 1, 2002): 377–88, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/089443902237317; Cristiano 
Castelfranchi, “The Theory of Social Functions: Challenges 
for Computational Social Science and Multi-Agent 
Learning,” Cognitive Systems Research 2, no. 1 (April 1, 2001): 
5–38, https://doi.org/10.1016/S1389-0417(01)00013-4; 
Flaminio Squazzoni, “A (Computational) Social Science 
Perspective on Societal Transitions,” Computational and 
Mathematical Organization Theory 14, no. 4 (December 1, 2008): 
266–82, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-008-9038-y. 
8 Walter C. Hurty, “Dynamic Analysis of Structural Systems 
Using Component Modes,” AIAA Journal 3, no. 4 (1965): 
678–85, https://doi.org/10.2514/3.2947; Erich Jantsch, 
“From Forecasting and Planning to Policy Sciences,” Policy 
Sciences 1, no. 1 (March 1, 1970): 31–47, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00145191; J Brian McLoughlin 
and Judith N Webster, “Cybernetic and General-System 
Approaches to Urban and Regional Research: A Review of 
the Literature,” Environment and Planning A 2, no. 4 
Intelligence9 debates of the 1950-60s have led to the 
emergence of Complexity Science10 and the 
popularization of Agent-Based Modelling11 in 
sociology and behavioral economics. As computers 
became more powerful and widely available in the 
1980s, first forms of Data Mining12, Genetic 
Algorithms13 and System Dynamics Models14 emerged 
in social research. Through the 1990s, earlier 
adoptions of Internet data on social research began to 
emerge, creating multi-layered connections into 
complexity research, network science and urban 
systems modelling. At certain times, these attempts 
merged into the existing quantitative strand in social 
sciences, where in others, computational progress 
embarked on its own journey, steering clear of 
mainstream statistical and mathematical methods. By 
2000s, computer models of large sets of quantified 
data were already being used in cognition, decision-
making, behavioral approaches, groups and 
organization, social interactions and systemic analysis 
of world events. Conte et. al.15 identify three main 
schools of development in ComSoc: deductive (macro 
theory-building through mathematical modelling and 
computer processing), generative (micro theory-
building through behavioral modelling and computer 
                                                
(December 1, 1970): 369–408, 
https://doi.org/10.1068/a020369. 
9 M. Minsky, “Steps toward Artificial Intelligence,” Proceedings 
of the IRE 49, no. 1 (January 1961): 8–30, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/JRPROC.1961.287775; J. R. 
Carbonell, “AI in CAI: An Artificial-Intelligence Approach 
to Computer-Assisted Instruction,” IEEE Transactions on 
Man-Machine Systems 11, no. 4 (December 1970): 190–202, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TMMS.1970.299942; Bonnie 
Lynn Webber and Nils J. Nilsson, Readings in Artificial 
Intelligence (Morgan Kaufmann, 2014). 
10 Kenneth E. Boulding, “General Systems Theory—The 
Skeleton of Science,” Management Science 2, no. 3 (April 1, 
1956): 197–208, https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2.3.197; A. 
K. Zvonkin and L. A. Levin, “The Complexity of Finite 
Objects and the Development of the Concepts of 
Information and Randomness by Means of the Theory of 
Algorithms,” Russian Mathematical Surveys 25, no. 6 (1970): 83, 
https://doi.org/10.1070/RM1970v025n06ABEH001269; 
Peter Caws, “Science, Computers, and the Complexity of 
Nature,” Philosophy of Science 30, no. 2 (April 1, 1963): 158–64, 
https://doi.org/10.1086/287926. 
11 David L. Banks and Nicholas Hengartner, “Social 
Networks,” in Encyclopedia of Quantitative Risk Analysis and 
Assessment (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2008), 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470061596.risk0667; Thomas 
J. Fararo, “Mathematical Sociology,” in The Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Sociology (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2007), 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosm052.pub2
; Roger D. Evered, “A Typology of Explicative Models,” 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 9, no. 3 (January 1, 
1976): 259–77, https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-
1625(76)90011-1. 
12 John V. Seidel and Jack A. Clark, “THE 
ETHNOGRAPH: A Computer Program for the Analysis of 
Qualitative Data,” Qualitative Sociology 7, no. 1–2 (March 1, 
1984): 110–25, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987111; 
David Myers, “‘Anonymity Is Part of the Magic’: Individual 
Manipulation of Computer-Mediated Communication 
Contexts,” Qualitative Sociology 10, no. 3 (September 1, 1987): 
simulations) and complexity science (use of non-static 
large and live datasets to explain and forecast behavior 
and choice-based uncertainty) variants. 
 
With the emergence of digital platforms and social 
media, and global proliferation of smartphones, 
ComSoc departed from its previous focus and began 
harvesting this new, abundant and highly granular type 
of digital data. Current definitions of ComSoc 
therefore distinguish between computer-based social 
science16, which is using computer programs to 
process quantitative social data and ComSoc, which 
processes enormous chunks of - often real-time - 
Internet data17. Although the quantity and granularity 
of digital data produced every day is impressive, a key 
question remains how to process such data in a 
meaningful way and how to build social theory using 
it. As of July 2016, Instagram, Twitter, Facebook and 
other social media platforms combined, produced 
around 650 million publicly available posts per day18, 
making up ‘the largest increase in the expressive capacity of 
humanity in the history of the world’19. With the emergence 
of increasingly more powerful computers, along with 
most creative data processing software, all scientific 
disciplines gained access to historically unprecedented 
251–66, https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00988989; Ronald L 
Breiger, Scott A Boorman, and Phipps Arabie, “An 
Algorithm for Clustering Relational Data with Applications 
to Social Network Analysis and Comparison with 
Multidimensional Scaling,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 
12, no. 3 (August 1, 1975): 328–83, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-2496(75)90028-0. 
13 D A Snow and and R. Machalek, “The Sociology of 
Conversion,” Annual Review of Sociology 10, no. 1 (1984): 167–
90, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.10.080184.001123; 
H. M. Collins, “The Seven Sexes: A Study in the Sociology 
of a Phenomenon, or the Replication                 of 
Experiments in Physics,” Sociology 9, no. 2 (May 1, 1975): 
205–24, https://doi.org/10.1177/003803857500900202. 
14 TOM R. BURNS, “The Sociology of Complex Systems: 
An Overview of Actor-System-Dynamics Theory,” World 
Futures 62, no. 6 (September 1, 2006): 411–40, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02604020600798619; Reinier de 
Man, “The Use of Forecasts in Energy Policy: An 
Application of Rule Systems Theory to the Comparative 
Analysis of Public Policy Processes,” Systems Practice 2, no. 2 
(June 1, 1989): 213–38, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01059500. 
15 R. Conte et al., “Manifesto of Computational Social 
Science,” The European Physical Journal Special Topics 214, no. 1 
(November 1, 2012): 325–46, 
https://doi.org/10.1140/epjst/e2012-01697-8. 
16 Norman P. Hummon and Patrick Doreian, 
“Computational Methods for Social Network Analysis,” 
Social Networks 12, no. 4 (December 1, 1990): 273–88, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(90)90011-W. 
17 Joop J. Hox, “Computational Social Science Methodology, 
Anyone?,” Methodology 13, no. Supplement 1 (June 1, 2017): 
3–12, https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-2241/a000127. 
18 Derek Ruths and Jürgen Pfeffer, “Social Media for Large 
Studies of Behavior,” Science 346, no. 6213 (November 28, 
2014): 1063–64, 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.346.6213.1063. 
19 R. Michael Alvarez, Computational Social Science (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016): viii. 
and unfathomably detailed information on micro and 
macro-level human interactions. 
 
Computational IR (hereafter, ComInt) derives largely 
from the founding and advent of ComSoc. in the last 
few years. Related to, but separate from ComSoc, 
ComInt deals exclusively with core IR topics of power, 
conflict/peace, state behavior, international 
norms/institutions and the world system/order. As 
ComInt starts dealing with non-state actors (NGOs, 
MNCs, media, religious groups, Diasporas, militants 
etc.) it steers further into the domain of sociology and 
shares common ground with digital, or tech 
sociologists. This domain requires even further novel 
methods, as tracing the transient shifts and trends of 
non-state actors require a way to bring ethnography 
close to the field of computational methods that both 
include, but also expand upon the existing approaches 
of digital and/or Internet ethnography. 
 
Both data scientists and natural sciences scholars I got 
the luck of working with at Oxford Internet Institute, 
Oxford Computer Science Department and the Alan 
Turing Institute had a distinct interest in the realist 
strand of IR. They had an automatic tendency to 
accept states as singular and primary units of analysis 
in their approaches and without exception, all of them 
wanted to address questions related to survival, 
conflict and security - all from a state-centric point of 
view. Defense, balance of power, armed conflict and 
resource-infrastructure (capability) oriented research 
agendas have attracted significantly more 
computational research attention than other promising 
approaches in IR such as constructivism, post-
structuralism, critical or post-modern theories. This is 
a shame, as I will demonstrate later on, data mining, 
entity recognition or geo-statistical mapping methods 
can successfully challenge a number of these 
approaches. 
 
Defined in simple terms ComInt, relies on the mining 
and processing of vast quantities of digital social 
footprint to study, model and explain world events. In 
doing that, it transcends the traditional schism 
between qualitative and quantitative methodology and 
presents a ‘third way’ methodology that frees the 
researcher from the restrictions of both 
methodological schools. ComInt predominantly (but 
not exclusively) uses large chunks of digital footprint 
and focuses on social online activities that generate 
enormous quantities of social data. This is one of the 
reasons why ComInt or ComSoc didn’t exist a decade 
ago, and also a reason why merely using numerical 
analysis software like R, Python and MatLab to model 
                                                
20 Gustav Herdan, “Quantitative Linguistics or Generative 
Grammar?,” Linguistics 2, no. 4 (2009): 56–65, 
https://doi.org/10.1515/ling.1964.2.4.56. 
21 Kenneth W. Church and Robert L. Mercer, “Introduction 
to the Special Issue on Computational Linguistics Using 
Large Corpora,” Computational Linguistics 19, no. 1 (March 
1993): 1–24. 
existing quantitative data, isn’t really ComSoc or 
ComInt. The origin, size and type of data that is 
collected make the main difference, as well as the main 
focus of study; the Internet and digital 
interdependencies. 
 
Charting the Waters: Main Questions of ComInt 
 
ComInt is an emerging field with yet unclear analytical 
borders. How to study, research and teach it remains a 
developing endeavour. The purpose of this section is 
to set five main signal posts across a vast scientific 
territory, helping newcomers to identify and scale out 
the field. These five signal posts constitute five 
different approaches to digital data processing, along 
with their theoretical and research design point of 
view: a) language/text, b) mapping, c) modelling, d) 
communication and e) networks. 
 
i. Language and Text 
 
Although linguistics has so far predominantly been 
used by the qualitative part of social sciences and IR, 
computational tools introduced new approaches to the 
quantitative study of large amounts of text. 
Quantitative linguistics20 existed as a vibrant sub-
discipline as far back in the 1960s, but the advent of 
computational linguistics21 as relevant to IR is a 
relatively new phenomenon, since it renders 
historically unprecedented volumes qualitative 
information usable by text processing programs. 
Traditionally, IR’s relationship with linguistics has 
largely been driven through critical discourse analysis, 
where qualitative data was interpreted as 
‘unmeasurable’22, containing qualities like emotion, 
sentiment and judgement that couldn’t conceivably be 
analyzed through numeration. Digitization of text and 
the advent of speech recognition technologies have 
enabled large chunks of text to be searchable. Then 
came the process by which vast quantities of 
parliamentary archives, historical documents and 
official statements became digitized, bringing text 
analysis into the domain of computation. Today, 
thanks to the Internet and social media, more than 7 
million web pages23 of text are being added to our 
collective repository of text, searchable, quantifiable 
and measureable. 
 
Text mining tools such as WordStat, RapidMiner, 
KHCoder aim to dig into vast quantities of written 
resources and even real-time transcribed speech 
through specialized computer software. They differ 
fundamentally from online text searching tools such as 
22 Richard E. Palmer, “Postmodernity and Hermeneutics,” 
Boundary 2 5, no. 2 (1977): 363–94, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/302200; Paul Hernadi, “Dual 
Perspective: Free Indirect Discourse and Related 
Techniques,” Comparative Literature 24, no. 1 (1972): 32–43, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1769380. 
23 http://www.internetlivestats.com/ 
Google or Bing by allowing the analyst to establish 
connections, detect patterns and build networks 
between very large text datasets, rather than merely 
searching within them. Although these tools and 
methods are being advanced and updated at great pace, 
some analytical elements remain recurrent across most 
studies. 
 
• Information Retrieval is perhaps the oldest of 
text mining tools and one that is the easiest 
to replicate by simple programming. 
Information retrieval identifies the 
documents in a text dataset to match a 
specific search term. Google, Yahoo or Bing 
search engines are the best-known 
information retrieval systems, and almost all 
libraries use a version of these systems. 
• Natural Language Processing on the other hand 
bring text mining into the domain of artificial 
intelligence: how can computers understand 
a diverse set of human language in a way that 
humans communicate with each other? In 
other words, how can a computer 
automatically identify verbs, nouns, 
emotions, threats and sarcasm in a new 
language it is introduced to? How should an 
algorithm recognize ‘Donald Trump is a 
great President’ when the statement is used 
as sarcasm, as part of a critical tweet, for 
example? Natural Language Processing is 
crucial to ‘teach’ a computer how to code and 
interpret different, hidden meanings in 
language, as well as culturally-contingent, 
unique expressions. This process is usually 
the first step in building a corpus (body of 
textual digital knowledge) to build 
information extraction and data mining 
systems. 
• Information Extraction is the process by which 
unstructured textual data is reorganized into 
a structured form based on the corpus 
obtained by Natural Language Processing. It 
is further split into three main approaches 
• Term Analysis, which extracts 
different versions and references to 
the same term in a range 
documents, especially when these 
documents include a mixture of 
official, unofficial, translated and 
native-language versions. 
• Named-Entity Recognition, which 
extracts people, organizations or 
                                                
24 Adam Bermingham et al., “Combining Social Network 
Analysis and Sentiment Analysis to Explore the Potential for 
Online Radicalisation,” in Proceedings of the 2009 International 
Conference on Advances in Social Network Analysis and Mining, 
ASONAM ’09 (Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer 
Society, 2009), 231–236, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ASONAM.2009.31. 
25 H. Chen, “Sentiment and Affect Analysis of Dark Web 
Forums: Measuring Radicalization on the Internet,” in 2008 
groups, in addition to different 
expressions of numbers 
(percentages, time and location) 
• Fact Extraction, which identifies 
and extracts relationships, networks 
and subtle connections in a 
document, such as between entities, 
events, dates and geographic 
designations. 
 
The resultant processes enable the researcher to 
discover previously unidentified and unestablished 
knowledge from text and especially by studying large 
bodies of text in relation to each other. For example, 
by deep diving into American, British, Russian and 
French official documents about the 1945 Yalta 
Conference might give us comparative information 
over how all four sides understood and interpreted the 
terms of the conference, allowing us to generate new 
knowledge in diplomatic history over how these 
countries structured their foreign policies through 
early Cold War. 
 
Some of the most promising employments of 
computational language and text analysis on 
international relations involve sentiment analysis, 
detection of certain types of behavior (such as 
radicalization) through text, opinion mining and 
violent event detection/prediction. In one of the most 
relevant cases for IR, Bermingham et al.24 demonstrate 
how harvesting word and sentiment combinations in 
Youtube’s comment section of jihadi videos can offer 
a predictive model of radicalization. Delving beyond 
the scope of the Internet, Hsinchun Chen25 for 
example, has discovered an automated sentiment 
mining model the Dark Web text data, presenting a 
methodological avenue for the detection of potential 
radicalization online. Dubvey et. al. took out 
automated sentiment mining methods beyond 
radicalization/terrorism research and harvested digital 
media posts of Indian diplomats. In doing so the 
researchers presented a promising model on how 
foreign service members interact with politics in online 
space. Finally, a personal favorite of mine, Hannes 
Mueller and Christopher Rauh have recently published 
an excellent paper26, which successfully predicts 
political violence by harvesting automated newspaper 
text. The authors argue that it is possible to predict 
armed conflict and political violence in a specific 
country by analyzing within-country variation of topics 
in national newspapers. Finally, one of the earliest 
forms of IR-relevant text mining studies in Turkey has 
IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security 
Informatics, 2008, 104–9, 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ISI.2008.4565038. 
26 Hannes Mueller and Christopher Rauh, “Reading Between 
the Lines: Prediction of Political Violence Using Newspaper 
Text,” American Political Science Review, December 2017, 1–18, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000570. 
been conducted by Hatipoglu et. al.27 on how digital 
information and content diffusion on 2015 ‘Kobani 
riots’ in Turkey influenced foreign policy perceptions 
at the national scale. 
 
Text mining is useful when it is used alongside another 
method, such as discourse analysis, process tracing or 
statistics. Furthermore, text mining research groups 
perform better when they contain a subject expert 
(historian, sociologist or ethnographer) and a linguist 
(theorist) alongside programmer(s) and engineer(s), in 
contrast to research clusters that contain only the latter 
two. Usually the hardest and unfortunately the most 
overlooked aspect of text mining is building a corpus 
that is culturally, contextually and case-wise aware of 
the nuances and subtleties of the language(s) that 
is/are being studied. Furthermore, both the corpus 
and search terms need to be grounded in theory, in 
order to avoid concept stretching or build a corpus 
with redundant or irrelevant terms. 
 
ii. Mapping 
 
Mapping and geospatial analysis contribute to some of 
the most central components of IR, including 
geopolitics/geography, borders and space. It is also 
one of the most popular approaches to generating 
event data, which allows researchers to display spatial 
dynamics of war, conflict and inequality. The terms 
GIS (Geographic Information Systems) and 
‘geospatial’ are usually used interchangeably, with 
often unclear differences that separate the two. Both 
approaches refer to visual systems where geographic 
information is stored in layers, that are then viewed, 
manipulated and measured through a dedicated 
mapping software. The essence of mapping research is 
geographical coordinates and other geographical data 
(altitude, topography, elevation, depth, etc.) that are 
often coupled and analyzed in relation to tabular data 
that contains various sets of statistical information 
such as landmarks, infrastructure or econometric data.  
 
Mapping has become exceptionally relevant and 
important to the study of IR and other social sciences, 
mainly because of the introduction of geolocation 
information integrated into smart devices and social 
media. Through the generation of large sets of social 
data containing geographical information, researchers 
are now able to study social and political phenomena 
with much higher level of granularity, sometimes in 
real-time. Instead of using geographical data to study 
natural resources, transportation infrastructure or 
household income, we are increasingly able to derive 
behavioral information through micro expressions of 
                                                
27 Emre Hatipoğlu et al., “Sosyal Medya ve Türk Dış 
Politikası: Kobani Tweetleri Üzerinden Türk Dış Politikası 
Algısı,” Uluslararası İlişkiler 13, no. 52 (2016): 175–89. 
28 Hein E. Goemans and Kenneth A. Schultz, “The Politics 
of Territorial Claims: A Geospatial Approach Applied to 
Africa,” International Organization 71, no. 1 (January 2017): 31–
64, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818316000254. 
digital activity. (Foursquare check-ins, Facebook status 
updates, tweets containing geo-location information) 
This yields vast quantities of new information related 
to human behavior and relations for the use of 
emergency response teams (emergency behavior of 
large groups of people), local governments 
(transportation and traffic behavior of individuals), 
companies (purchasing power analysis, response to 
advertisements, marketing analysis), among others. 
 
Geospatial research is conducted both on dedicated 
GIS application packages (such as ArcGis, QGis), or 
mainstream data processing-programming platforms 
that have GIS plug-ins (like Python and R). Even 
Excel is experimenting with mapping plug-ins that can 
be used with existing .xls or .csv files. Geospatial data 
on the other hand, is divided into two categories: 
vector and raster data. Vector data refers to points and 
polygons that designate or enclose a specific 
coordinate on a base map, such as coordinates of 
schools in a geographical area, or allocated farmland in 
a rural province. Raster data on the other hand refer to 
aerial imagery and digital elevation models that render 
a map three dimensional. While raster data is not really 
necessary to analyze school districts, it is crucial for the 
study of river flows or transportation systems. These 
datasets are usually stored in dedicated geodatabases 
that can be downloaded for study, or users can 
generate their own datasets through manual entries, or 
web scraping techniques. Increasingly, LiDAR (Light 
Detection and Ranging), UAVs (unmanned aerial 
vehicles), GPS (geographic positioning systems) and 
satellites have begun to be used more frequently to 
generate open-access geospatial analysis data. 
 
Some of the best examples of geospatial IR excel not 
only in finesse in visualizing location data, but 
successfully tell a story that builds and tests a theory. 
Hein E. Goemans and Kenneth A. Schultz for 
example, demonstrated how states in Africa make 
claims to some border areas and not others through 
aggregating a digital geospatial dataset of border 
disputes in a cross-continent study.28 The ingenuity of 
the piece is that it discovers territorial contestation 
taking root not from natural boundaries such as 
watersheds or rivers, but mostly from historical-
colonial contestation points. Mark Graham et al. on 
the other hand, have demonstrated how digital labor 
affects global worker micro-economies, specifically in 
terms of how type of online labor influences worker 
bargaining power, economic inclusion and worker 
livelihoods.29 By using a dataset showing geographic 
engagement with digital labor, the researchers come up 
with both micro-level behavior and macro-level 
29 Mark Graham, Isis Hjorth, and Vili Lehdonvirta, “Digital 
Labour and Development: Impacts of Global Digital Labour 
Platforms and the Gig Economy on Worker Livelihoods,” 
Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 23, no. 2 (May 
1, 2017): 135–62,  
https://doi.org/10.1177/1024258916687250. 
structures of what could be termed as ‘digital Marxist 
research’. In one of the most famous examples of 
geospatial IR dataset construction, Alberto Alesina et. 
al. delve into the origins of ethnic inequality using 
satellite-generated nighttime luminosity data.30 By 
exploring time-frequency distribution of electricity, the 
researchers come up with important tests of intra-state 
ethnic inequality theories, including more macro-scale 
developmental and economic disparities within and 
across countries. One of the most interesting newer 
studies on geospatial proximity networks has been 
conducted by Jesse Hammond31, who demonstrated 
that network of roads and connections between 
population centers are the primary determinants of 
conflict onset and diffusion in civil wars. This study 
challenges previous findings on geography and conflict 
by discovering a significant reporting bias in the 
building of past conflict datasets. 
 
 
 
iii. Modelling 
 
Mathematical and physical modelling of social 
phenomena aren’t new. Since 1960s, applying natural 
sciences principles and functions on social events have 
been amply used by researchers.32 The advent of 
computational methods allowed computer science to 
bridge this interdisciplinary gap between natural and 
social sciences. In the last decade, three types of main 
modelling approaches have grown in popularity: 
mathematical, physics-based and bio-organistic 
models. These approaches allow us to better study 
mass social events like voting, riots, war and political 
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(December 1968): 1258–64,  
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33 Steven Polgar, “Health and Human Behavior: Areas of 
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Current Anthropology 3, no. 2 (April 1, 1962): 159–205, 
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Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee 
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36 David L. Wagner, Ronald T. Perkins, and Rein Taagepera, 
“Complete Solution to Richardson’s Arms Race Equations,” 
Journal of Peace Science 1, no. 2 (February 1, 1975): 159–72, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/073889427500100206. 
engagement at an unprecedented granularity. The 
advent of computational methods significantly 
increased the impact and relevance of all three 
modelling approaches for social sciences and IR. 
 
Mathematical modelling of social phenomena is 
structured upon a somewhat problematic assumption 
that human behavior can be observed within and 
based on arbitrarily set constants and can be measured 
in numerical terms. Although elements such as 
uncertainty, chance and bias are added into models, the 
foundational assumption that human behavior can be 
quantified is still there.33 While this assumption is 
subject to a separate set of epistemological debates, 
mathematical models of human and social behavior are 
nonetheless both popular and useful in testing 
concepts such as equilibrium/non-equilibrium, 
stability/instability or order/chaos that can assume 
subjective meanings without proper measurement. 
Mathematical models in social sciences are structured 
upon a number of sub-approaches such as 
voting/preference (Arrow’s impossibility theorem34, 
Shapley-Shubrik index35), dynamic models 
(Richardson arms race model36, Lanchester combat 
models37, predator/prey model38) and ecology (phase 
space39, boxicity40) and stochaistic models (Markov 
chains41, learning theory42, social power approach43). 
 
Physics models are more complex and less intuitive for 
social sciences, mainly because of lack of bridging 
literature between physics and social sciences. 
Although the number of approaches are growing by 
the emergence of a new breed of interdisciplinary 
researcher doing this bridging work, there are roughly 
37 N. J. MacKay, “Lanchester Combat Models,” 
arXiv:math/0606300, June 13, 2006,  
http://arxiv.org/abs/math/0606300. 
38 Michael E. Gilpin, “Spiral Chaos in a Predator-Prey 
Model,” The American Naturalist 113, no. 2 (February 1, 1979): 
306–8, https://doi.org/10.1086/283389. 
39 Brian Walker et al., “Resilience Management in Social-
Ecological Systems: A Working Hypothesis for a 
Participatory Approach,” Conservation Ecology 6, no. 1 (June 
19, 2002), https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-00356-060114. 
40 Margaret B. Cozzens and Fred S. Roberts, “Computing the 
Boxicity of a Graph by Covering Its Complement by 
Cointerval Graphs,” Discrete Applied Mathematics 6, no. 3 
(September 1, 1983): 217–28, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218X(83)90077-X. 
41 Arthur Spirling, “‘Turning Points’ in the Iraq Conflict,” 
The American Statistician 61, no. 4 (November 1, 2007): 315–
20, https://doi.org/10.1198/000313007X247076; Simon 
Jackman, “Bayesian Analysis for Political Research,” Annual 
Review of Political Science 7, no. 1 (2004): 483–505, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104706. 
42 Bruce A. Campbell, “Theory Building in Political 
Socialization: Explorations of Political Trust and Social 
Learning Theory,” American Politics Quarterly 7, no. 4 
(October 1, 1979): 453–69, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X7900700404. 
43 Arnold S. Tannenbaum, “An Event-Structure Approach 
to Social Power and to the Problem of Power 
Comparability,” Behavioral Science 7, no. 3 (July 1, 1962): 315–
31, https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830070304. 
two main types of physics modelling that can 
meaningfully be adapted into social sciences. The first 
of those, cellular automata44 for example, deals with 
the interaction of particle systems in parallel and 
sequential dimensions. Take for example the spread of 
war and conflict between neighboring countries. Each 
country i becomes ‘infected’ with war (Si = 1), if at least 
one of its nearest neighbors is already witnessing 
conflict. Computational tools handle this diffusion 
mechanism well, predicting and modeling the 
likelihood of, for example, infection (i) to be spread 
across 24 different neighboring countries in time t, 
coming up with a predictive model of how far and how 
fast can the conflict spread into adjacent territories. 
The second type of physics modelling derives from 
temperature models (Boltzmann probability45). They 
give us how energy and pressure are diffused across 
different units and how systems enter into entropy or 
recalibration based on the latent or free energy 
travelling between the constituent elements of the 
system. To clarify for our purposes, Boltzmann 
probability would give us diplomatic pressure, 
international bandwagoning or buck-passing behavior 
within an alliance or regional system: if your allies sign 
a diplomatic treaty, they can also influence you into 
signing the same treaty, even though the said treaty 
may not be in your country’s interests. Thus, let E be 
the number of closest allies signing the treaty, minus 
the number of allies that aren’t signing the treaty. The 
probability for your country to switch then is given by 
the energy different and equal to exp(−2E/T) (or 1 if E 
< 0), generating the terms in which you can withstand 
the pressure from treaty-signing allies and refrain from 
signing the treaty that doesn’t serve your national 
interests. Both cases can be adopted into ComInt 
through testing theories on voting in international 
institutions, alliance behavior, international financial 
markets and interactions between security cultures. 
 
Bio-organistic types of modelling also substantially 
derive from mathematical and physics modelling. 
However, one particular type of biology model 
penetrated more than other types into the domain of 
social sciences: epidemiology46. Epidemiological 
modelling is a simplified version of describing 
transmission of diseases through a pre-determined 
network of agents. Epidemiological models allow 
social scientists to make sense of collective action and 
large-scale popular mobilization in the form of riots, 
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protests, migration and emergency social behavior, 
such as disasters. Epidemiological models based on 
mathematical formulations of how infectious diseases 
spread, can offer to make sense of complex social 
behavior that would otherwise be very hard to monitor 
and measure. There have been different 
methodological approaches to the study of complex 
social behavior such as agent-based models, spatial 
data studies and simple mathematical formulations. 
What makes epidemiological models different from 
past methods is its conceptualization and modes of 
measurement on disorder, uncertainty and 
unpredictable complexity.  
 
One of the most fascinating and novel studies on 
social epidemiology has been Laurent Bonnasse-
Gahot et. al.47 seminal study on how 2005 French riots 
spread and were contained. Building a riot contagion 
model, the authors assess geographic proximity, social 
networks and riot outcome in explaining how 
neighborhood/district relations have been 
instrumental in the diffusion of these riots. Such riot 
and social movement modelling works are of direct 
interest for IR scholars as they will substantially 
strengthen some of the existing IR and PolSci theories 
on how conflicts start, diffuse and end. A second key 
study is Toby Davies et. al.48 account of how 2011 
London riots and their policing have followed a direct 
spatial contagion model, building a high-granularity 
digital event dataset. The researchers test a number of 
IR-relevant topics such as force deterrence, local 
escalation models and crisis signaling, through 
measuring police-to-riot distance, with the added 
variables of police versus rioter numbers. Finally, both 
Guo et. al.49 and Kirby and Ward50 make attempts to 
generate a macro explanation of war and peace 
through spatial modelling. Guo et. al. formulate 
‘betweenness centrality’ (a physics principle) in order 
to assert that cities that have the highest betweenness 
factor (population density, ethnic fractionalization 
versus the number of outside connections) are more 
likely to contain conflicts in geographies in-between. 
Kirby and Ward on the other hand reject nation states 
as the primary actors in peace and war, and using a 
digital dataset from Africa, they argue that it is the local 
and tribal relations that determine the course and 
extent of state-level violence.  
the Role of Contagion,” arXiv:1701.07479 [Physics], January 
25, 2017, http://arxiv.org/abs/1701.07479. 
48 Toby P. Davies et al., “A Mathematical Model of the 
London Riots and Their Policing,” Scientific Reports 3 
(February 21, 2013): 1303, 
https://doi.org/10.1038/srep01303. 
49 Weisi Guo et al., “The Spatial Ecology of War and Peace,” 
arXiv:1604.01693 [Physics], April 6, 2016, 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01693. 
50 Andrew M. Kirby and Michael D. Ward, “The Spatial 
Analysis of Peace and War,” Comparative Political Studies 20, 
no. 3 (October 1, 1987): 293–313, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414087020003002. 
iv. Communication 
 
Digital technologies have brought forward another big 
leap in communication, comparable to the effect of the 
invention of writing, telegram and telephone. Thanks 
to digital technologies, we communicate more 
frequently, in verbal and non-verbal ways (such as 
emojis, or ‘like’s) allowing us to engage with a 
multitude of social, political and economic activities 
simultaneously. The rise of social media too, has 
allowed us to view and measure human 
communication in interactive and forum-like settings, 
leading to the testing of central IR communication 
topics like misinformation, uncertainty, signaling and 
cognitive bias.51 Furthermore, Internet and social 
media have fundamentally changed how we seek 
information, access the news and form our opinion on 
political and social matters.52 An added factor is how 
social media algorithms are acting as intermediaries in 
our political searches, giving us non-random search 
results based on a number of parameters.53 This means 
that how people access and consume facts and 
information online may be different than another, 
leading to sustenance or exacerbation of polarization 
in political views.54 The issue of how political 
information is communicated online and represented 
in digital news media has become a key debate in 
political science and one that has significant 
implications for IR. How do key foreign policy actors 
and decision-makers use social media? How does the 
Internet facilitate or impede information-seeking 
behavior of citizens and politicians during an 
international crisis? How does different consumption 
patterns of digital news influence how citizens and 
politicians view and understand diplomacy and in turn, 
how does these patterns translate into actual foreign 
policy? 
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A newly emerging field of research in digital 
communication is the advent of bots (automated 
accounts) in digital space, fueling fake news and 
misleading information that exacerbate international 
crises and often lead to popular unrest. Fake news is 
conceptualized as misleading, incomplete or out of 
place information that is deliberately directed towards 
consuming and distraction online attention.55 
Although fake news can be driven by human accounts, 
recent scholarly attention has focused on how 
automated accounts (bots) help distribute such news 
during crucial time frames, such as pre-election periods 
or international crises.56 Bot research has thus 
suddenly become a key topic in political science and 
concerns IR directly, although the subject of inquiry 
sits at the intersection of computer science and 
communication theory. 
 
From a methodological standpoint, Derek Ruths and 
Jürgen Pfeffer have already demonstrated57 how social 
media – although not always representative58 – can 
offer better results compared to traditional polling. 
This is both due to significant biases associated with 
social media access and expression, but also the blurry 
picture provided by bots. Kollanyi et. al. has 
demonstrated59 how bots have influenced the results 
of the US Presidential elections; a study that was 
repeated in Forelle et. al. work60 on bots during 
Venezuelan elections. Although this seems like a 
political science question, external involvement and 
disruption in national elections is definitely a problem 
for international relations, explained in detail in Taylor 
Owen’s book on how digital disruption is 
contextualized in IR.61 An especially vibrant debate 
currently revolves around Russian capabilities as a ‘bot 
superpower’, able to disrupt and distract political 
Samuel C. Woolley and Philip N. Howard, “Automation, 
Algorithms, and Politics| Political Communication, 
Computational Propaganda, and Autonomous Agents — 
Introduction,” International Journal of Communication 10, no. 0 
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processes in Western countries.62 Further detailed 
accounts of Chinese governmental controls on social 
media and what it means for state-society relations 
have been beautifully modelled in King et. al. 201363 
and 201764. 
 
A secondary strand of IR-related literature in digital 
communication is the extent to which online 
campaigning affects political processes and social 
mobilization. Koc-Michalska et. al.65 has explained 
how online campaigning affects political elections in 
France, Germany, Poland and the UK, demonstrating 
that resources, rather than innovation determines 
success in digital campaigns. In a similarly pessimistic 
study, Margetts et. al.66 ran an experiment, testing how 
political information online affects decision-making of 
individuals, finding that online information is 
behavior-changing when it is shared by large groups of 
people. If the information – whether true or false – 
isn’t shared by a critical mass (or ‘social network 
capital67’), it has little influence over political behavior, 
the study finds. In an interesting twist, Yasseri and 
Bright explore digital information seeking behavior 
through Wikipedia traffic data, discovering that 
political parties whose Wikipedia pages witness a surge 
in visits close to elections, tend to do well in those 
elections, compared to other candidates or parties that 
haven’t enjoyed Wikipedia attention.68 This model can 
be replicated in to study UN voting patterns or 
elections within international organizations. 
 
v. Networks 
 
Digital network research is another field that is 
growing in popularity and allows researchers to study 
political and power relations in digital space. Often, 
creative computational researchers discover digital 
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relations and influence maps that cannot be discovered 
through research in physical space - either due to the 
controversial nature of the topic, or the difficulty in 
finding data. Extremism and radicalization networks 
are the primary foci of computational network 
analysis. Through digital relations, researchers are able 
to find influencers, hierarchies and relations in digital 
space. This could be employed to discover diplomatic 
networks at the state and institutional level, as well as 
networks of radicalization at the non-state and sub-
state actor level. Ideology research too, can benefit 
greatly through computational methods, by the use of 
entity extraction algorithms.  
 
Classical network theory69 focuses on social networks 
among individuals (friendships, advice-seeking..) and 
formal contractual relationships (alliances, trade, 
security community). What makes network theory 
important to social science, politics and IR is its ability 
to conceptualize and theorize relations at the micro, 
meso and macro-levels of analysis in political 
processes, offering a structure to seemingly complex 
interactions.70 Accordingly, network theory stipulates 
that relations and internal-external pressures on those 
relations have the ability to affect beliefs and 
behaviors.71 Instead of adopting IR’s mainstream 
levels of analysis approach, network theory focuses on 
the interactions between these levels of analyses, 
aiming to conceptualize how these interactions lead to 
policy and behavior.72 Computational network analysis 
on the other hand, takes classical network theory to 
vast levels of size and complexity, not only designating 
relations between them, but also use artificial 
intelligence, machine learning and neural networks 
approaches to automatically generate real-time 
changes in these relations.73  
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One of the most relevant recent complex network 
studies to IR is Jonathan Bright’s work on identifying 
online extremist networks and the role of ideology in 
polarized digital structures.74 This work is relevant to 
IR, because it covers around 90 different political 
parties across 23 countries, providing a much-needed 
cross-national empirical evidence on the role echo 
chambers play in concentrating and isolating extreme 
views in a political communicative setting. Another 
important work is Efe Sevin’s working paper on how 
international actors and foreign policy practitioners 
use digital media to expedite and re-negotiate existing 
diplomatic processes.75 Building upon a Twitter-
scraped dataset of embassy and consulate connections 
across the global, Sevin makes the case that middle 
powers may have disproportionately more significant 
weight in international diplomacy by seizing upon the 
amplifying potential of social media. Finally, Caiani 
and Wagemann demonstrate how the Italian and 
German extreme far right connect in digital space, 
exploring aspects of communicative radicalization and 
network capital of extreme political ideologies.76 The 
authors discover that extremist networks cluster and 
connect differently across political cultures, with 
separate layers of connectors, leaders and marginalized 
sub-groups. 
 
My Personal History with ComInt 
I come from a qualitative background. Given 
University of Essex being a stronghold of discourse 
analysis, I developed keen interest in Foucauldian 
approaches to power and politics. Through my 
dissertation however, the amount of data I collected 
on discursive construction of violence, terrorism and 
conflict became so large that I was unable to deal with 
them meaningfully through qualitative analysis alone. 
When I bounced the idea of quantifying discourse with 
my PhD supervisor, he momentarily panicked, as the 
practice wasn’t as commonplace as it is nowadays. ‘You 
will either get kicked out of the PhD program, or get an award’ 
was his reply. In the following months, I learned 
statistics from scratch, engaging in successive crash 
courses in regression analysis and mathematical 
modelling offered at the university. These didn’t help, 
as such courses were still taught for extremely large 
classes with economy, management and political 
science students with different quantitative skills all 
pitted into the same class. I learned statistics and 
regression analysis mostly through self-study (Youtube 
didn’t exist back then). 
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My resultant dissertation combined a ten-year content 
analysis of open floor debates in three parliaments, 
coded and sorted according to sentiment, syntax and 
lexicon, with another matrix of coding for politicians’ 
ideologies and political interests. Eventually, I 
demonstrated that regardless of country and political 
system, conservative and liberal politicians used the 
same linguistic and sentiment characteristics to define 
intra-state conflicts. A conservative politician in the 
United States, Belgium and Turkey sounded 
significantly more alike, compared to liberal politicians 
in their own countries, and vice versa. And I could 
reliably demonstrate the relationship from a statistical 
point of view. This was good evidence that contributed 
to the trans-nationalization of conflict behavior and 
how crisis periods end up internationalizing certain 
ideologies. Thankfully, my advisor’s second prediction 
ended up happening. I wasn’t kicked out of the 
program and won the Middle East Studies 
Association’s Malcolm H. Kerr dissertation award. 
Although the methodology isn’t new anymore at this 
point, back when I submitted, quantifying and 
measuring discourse numerically was considered as a 
methodological heresy of sorts. This was effectively 
merging positivist and post-positivist traditions and 
like one of my examiners put: ‘like writing a Muslim 
Bible’. 
 
The second turning point in my multi-method odyssey 
was in 2015. After writing my book, I was focusing on 
the study of armed non-state actor behavior in 
northern Syria and northern Iraq, both getting 
increasingly more complex and frustrating to monitor. 
As actors on the ground quickly exchanged territory, 
merged, broke-away and disappeared on the 
battlefield, generating new knowledge or testing 
theories on conflict were all getting increasingly more 
difficult. I began generating elementary maps for my 
own study purposes using Google Earth layers and 
basic image processing software like Paint. It was 
around this time that I began to realize that the 
sophistication of one’s maps aren’t as important as the 
story those maps are telling. One of my completely 
low-tech maps would later be solicited for publication 
by the New York Times along an op-ed on armed 
violence in northern Iraq. But getting battlefield 
information was proving extremely difficult, as the 
majority of conflict events were taking place across the 
inaccessible parts of Syria and Iraq. Lucky for me - and 
perhaps for all conflict scholars - that the advent of 
mass social media, smartphone and digital propaganda 
coincided with the war against ISIS. This allowed 
conflict researchers to extract and process enormous 
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volumes of digital content shared by the locals, citizen 
journalists and the militants, who documented war 
deep inside the fog of war. A young militant for 
example, could share how their group struck a Syrian 
Army tank and post it online with a video and 
associated hashtag, intended as propaganda, but 
ending up becoming a data node for conflict 
researchers. I began scraping some of that content 
through Twitter, Instagram (before they changed their 
API) and Flickr. Perhaps the most interesting detail 
about these battlefield posts were the selfies, that 
constituted a large portion geotagged conflict events, 
which practically exposed them on the battlefield. I 
continued to scrape more of such tweets, eventually 
coming up with a test run of around 17,352 geotagged 
tweets through a two-year period, mapping them 
through time-frequency diffusion. The resultant 
combination of those images and videos gave me one 
of the most detailed and high-granularity war map that 
was out there at the time, rivaling the level of detail of 
many state-produced war maps that exited at the time, 
which I published with the Financial Times and 
Journal of International Affairs. 
 
I took my newfound methodological odyssey to 
Oxford, where I went as a visiting fellow at the Oxford 
Internet Institute (OII). OII was an interdisciplinary 
Oxford department, dedicated solely to the study of 
the Internet and digital data, along with its political, 
economic, social and psychological effects on human 
relations. It was made up of a very uncommon 
combination of scholars, from physics, biology, 
geography, computer science, mathematics and 
political science, all trying to approach different 
theoretical topics related to the Internet, through a 
multitude of methodologies. It was there that I learned 
how Gaussian particle physics principles could help 
explain how people chose their mates on Tinder and 
other online dating platforms, or how epidemiological 
models in biology could explain how riots and protests 
emerge and spread. It was there that I learned how to 
code (thanks to computer science doctoral training 
program for having me audit their Python classes), 
conduct network measurement, build algorithms for 
text mining, use more advanced mapping and network 
analysis software to dig deeper into the logic of large 
coding structures. I was then admitted to the Alan 
Turing Institute in London, where I had a chance to 
participate in data science research groups from 
Cambridge, Warwick, UCL and Edinburgh, that 
focused on urban analytics, extremism networks and 
measuring human digital behavior. 
 
The luxury of months of incubation and daily access 
to some of the brightest and pioneering minds on 
computational studies forced me to think about the 
future of IR, its methodological debates and how 
computational tools can be incorporated into the study 
of world events. My first project was an expanded and 
improved version of the earlier work on battlefield 
data. Focusing solely on selfies, I scraped battlefield 
digital data from geographically confined locations in 
Syria, using a corpus of keywords in English, Farsi, 
Kurdish and Arabic and generated an event dataset 
that only contained armed incidents. In my second 
project, I developed my earlier work on measuring 
how pre-digital and digital forms of mobilization 
influenced protest and resistance networks, by 
focusing on Turkey’s failed coup on 15 July 2016. 
Then, I took part in multiple research clusters on how 
cultural and geographical proximity between cities 
helped us measure the likelihood of conflict, how 
dyadic and multi-level sentiment analysis of digital text 
allow us to predict radicalization and terrorism 
networks, and using machine learning algorithms to 
visually detect and predict the likelihood of armed 
conflict using Google OpenMap images. 
 
The culmination of my dual visit to Oxford Internet 
Institute and the Alan Turing Institute was my ‘Turing 
Lecture’ in the latter one, where I made an 
introduction and exposition of the term 
‘Computational IR’, detailing how data science and 
international relations can form a productive 
partnership, in a way that doesn’t only benefit these 
two disciplines, but also form as the basis of 
collaboration with the full range of natural sciences 
scholars and social scientists. Since - to the best of my 
knowledge - there has been no previous use of the 
term, I’d like to coin ‘Computational International 
Relations’ as a way to establish a new methodological 
field that hopefully will transcend the traditional 
quantitative-qualitative schism in the field, as well as in 
social sciences. 
 
Method Training: Or ‘How to be a Computational IR Scholar’ 
 
Up until very recently, ComSoc training existed largely 
within the confines of quantitative-leaning social 
scientists taking data science courses, with the 
exception of the Oxford Internet Institute, Harvard 
Institute for Quantitative Social Science and Stanford 
University’s Computational Social Science Program, 
which are pioneering institutions of the field. Currently 
there are a wide range of choices for social scientists 
from summer courses to master’s degrees dedicated to 
computational social science. To the best of my 
knowledge, there are no ComInt programs; rather, IR 
scholars currently can take ComSoc courses and create 
their own sub-specialization. Oxford’s Center for 
Technology and Global Affairs, where I’m currently a 
research fellow, is also gearing up to fill in this vacuum 
in the near future. 
 
There are two aspects of ComInt training. The first 
one is the easier part: what kind of a technical 
foundation should students develop? Different 
ComSoc programs provide different curricula for this 
purpose, but there are common denominators. Data 
visualization, model construction and estimation, 
along with honing statistical skills is generally the first 
step. Later, understanding different data types used in 
computing, and various processing principles – 
clustering, event-driven simulation, approximating 
functions, derivatives and basic Monte Carlo 
techniques -  are required to build upon the initial 
foundation. At this time, introductory knowledge of 
Java, Shiny, Python, R and C++ should be introduced, 
along with mainstream programs such as ArcGis or 
QGis (for geospatial analysis), NVivo, RapidMiner or 
QDA (for text analysis), Gephi, iGraph or NodeXL 
(for network analysis), and Repast, Swarm, EpiModel 
or MASON (for various modelling analyses). These 
technical skills must be reinforced through 
qualitative/historical theoretical courses on spatial 
analysis, complexity research, logic of algorithms and 
basic neuroscience (mostly for complexity research). 
Final touches can be made through large dataset 
maintenance skills through Entity-Relationship 
Diagram (ERD), SQL (Structured Query Language), 
data definition language (DDL) and data manipulation 
language (DML). 
 
The second aspect of ComInt/ComSoc training is the 
harder part: understanding how much technical skill 
you need to learn and sustain for your own research 
career. Like any language, computer science requires 
sustained daily use to remember and preserve 
knowledge. To that end, being a ComInt/ComSoc 
scholar means a) knowing you can’t master all 
computer science tools, b) balancing between the main 
task of social scientists (theory-building) and methods-
driven nature of computer science and c) 
understanding which computational tools you need to 
develop and which ones to outsource. My answer to 
all three questions – at least for graduate students – is: 
be promiscuous. Spend at least six months to dig deep 
into the computer science world and immerse yourself 
in methods-driven research. Build your R packages, 
learn how to scrape Twitter data and spend some time 
visualizing them on a multitude of spatial, network and 
text-based software. Although most senior social 
scientists will advise you to not forget the fact that you 
are a social scientist, my advice is: forget it – at least 
for a limited period of time. This period is critical to 
learn how to think like a computer scientist; not just to 
get a new perspective, but also to understand the basics 
of computer-driven research. This is crucial, as 
although computer science methods are constantly 
evolving, basic principles of computers (automation, 
the logic of repeating work, strings, data structures, 
loops, variables, functions etc.) don’t change radically. 
You can quickly adapt to new programming languages 
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and platforms, once you know what a programming 
language does. It is also only after spending several 
months on coding that students can get a sense of what 
computational tools can do for their own research 
agenda and the kind of questions they seek to ask. 
 
The final part of ComInt/ComSoc training is the 
hardest part: forget everything. This phase is about 
deliberately stopping computer science work and 
return back to IR, PolSci or another social science 
discipline of origin. My advice would be to re-read the 
core theoretical readings of the field the student is 
coming from and to rethink the fundamentals of the 
field following several months of immersion in the 
world of programming. Another twist to this 
suggestion would be to return back to another social 
science discipline, instead of the student’s own point 
of origin. To give an example, an IR student going 
through the computational curve should ideally go to 
sociology and history to establish an introductory 
foundation there, creating a triangular expertise. 
Although not easy, mastery of IR and good 
introductory knowledge of computer science, and 
sociology or history will expand the student’s analytical 
prowess significantly. 
 
Case Studies from My Research Trajectory: How 
Can Conflict Researchers Benefit from ComInt? 
 
ComInt is hard to explain by demonstrating its 
application on one single research question. One 
significant line of research in ComInt focuses on the 
relationship between social media and international or 
comparative political processes under conflict. Some 
of the most important works in this field are: Tucker 
et. al. (2017) work on the relationship between social 
media and democracy,77 Steinert-Threlkeld’s study on 
the effects of Internet on social mobilization,78 Rød 
and Weidmann’s work on comparative 
authoritarianism and the Internet,79  Anita Gohdes’ 
study on how regimes hide their atrocities on the 
Internet,80 (as well as her important overview of how 
the use of Internet data has changed the study of 
conflict81), Mitts’ work on ISIS radicalization on 
Twitter,82 Little’s formal modelling work on how ICTs 
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affect protest behavior,83 Zeitzoff’s review of how 
social media is changing conflict84 (and his social 
experiment of the 2012 Gaza conflict85) and 
Gunitsky’s work on how autocracies use social media 
as a form of regime stabilization tool.86 The list is far 
from complete, however, as the discipline and its 
exciting methods are rapidly evolving and improving. 
 
Here, I’ll steer clear of engaging in yet another 
literature review and instead, try to explain how 
computational tools improved my own scholarship 
across different topics in IR by adopting hybrid 
methods. My first exposure to computational research 
has been through the nudge of a group of recently 
graduated Harvard computer science PhDs, who 
wanted to tackle issues related to security and conflict. 
IR students will receive similar calls from computer 
scientists. If not, they should initiate contact 
themselves, either through speaking to a computer 
scientist faculty, or peers in the computer/data science 
department. Such calls are usually the first step for any 
social scientist to collaborate with computer scientists. 
However, interdisciplinary research builds its 
momentum slowly, can be frustrating and this 
shouldn’t discourage new researchers from being 
persistent and continuing to engage with research 
partners. Although my research partners decided to set 
up a startup and drifted away from our research 
eventually, I learned the basics of web scraping, setting 
up web crawlers and using API data from them. These 
tools would ultimately be instrumental in my research 
project on mapping militant selfies in Syria. 
 
Conflict research in IR has developed a keen interest 
in event data in recent years. From statistical to 
geographic layers, event data enables us to track 
conflict patterns, targeting choices and border 
contestations across a single, or multiple conflict 
settings. But the majority of that event data (such as 
UCDP/PRIO or UMD) comes from ‘official’ sources, 
derived largely from state-level resources, of 
mainstream media companies that report on battlefield 
developments. But what about the inaccessible parts 
of a conflict? What if neither reporters, nor intelligence 
operatives of state actors can access no-go zones in a 
conflict and how do we get event data from there? Up 
until 2012-13, a clear answer was hard to provide. 
Thankfully for researchers, non-state actors’ use of 
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digital technologies, smartphones and social media 
have led to a strange setting where active combat and 
insider developments in no-go zones are broadcast 
digitally on a minute-by-minute basis with geotags. 
Militants overwhelmingly began using social media to 
publicize important events such as armed clashes, 
declarations of loyalty, or reports of death. Most 
groups in Syria such as ISIS, YPG or FSA have learned 
to catalogue these events online with dedicated 
hashtags and visuals for propaganda, making sure that 
they are easily searchable. For the exact same reason, 
they make excellent computational conflict data. In the 
first phase of my research, I have scraped around 
15,000 selfies from Syria, all belonging to Kurdish 
groups YPG, SDF and their offshoots, through 
January 2014 - June 2016. Building a word corpus 
consisting of words related to armed events (bombing, 
shooting, explosion, airstrike…) I’ve applied entity-
recognition algorithm to scrape all tweets containing 
these keywords in pre-set coordinates isolating 
northern Syria, and containing photos that were taken 
with the front camera of a smartphone (back then, this 
was the best way of scraping selfie data). I mapped out 
the resultant dataset to infer where Kurdish groups 
were fighting, where they were defending and which 
battles were they avoiding.87 This became the 
foundation of my article on Kurdish geopolitics later 
on.88 
 
While I was planning to expand the militant selfie 
study to other groups in Syria and also bring in 
Ukrainian groups, a failed coup attempt took place in 
Turkey, in July 2016. I reorganized my work to focus 
on the digital engagement patterns during the coup 
attempt and started to scrape geotagged tweets that 
clustered around six most widely shared hashtags. 
These hashtags not only gave me which districts 
mobilized the most against the coup attempt, but also 
generated a valuable dataset to model later on through 
physics or epidemiological approaches. Several things 
stood out from the study: first, it was religious 
networks (tariqas), rather than political party networks 
of AKP that had initiated the first mobilization against 
the coup. Although AKP networks later mobilized to 
significantly increase the numbers in the streets, tariqa-
dominant districts have been deployed faster and at 
greater volume during the earlier hours of the coup 
attempt.89 This computational data is important 
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because it gives us a good early measurement of digital 
sociology: in an increasingly interconnected world, 
what is the most foundational source of collective 
action? During emergencies and times of uncertainty, 
which fundamental social organizing forces manages 
to generate the momentum enough to mobilize masses 
into collective action? The case of Turkey’s failed coup 
reveals to us that at least in Turkish socio-cultural case, 
religious networks fill in this emergency role. I’m 
currently at the point of expanding this study into how 
different religious movements adapt to digital 
technologies and generate collective action in the US, 
Hungary, Serbia, Ukraine and Israel. 
 
Simultaneously, I’ve been drawn further into the 
concept of digital spoilers and distractors. Bot research 
is a growing and popular area of study, yet we still 
know so little about their role in international relations 
and how they influence global crises. My conversations 
with Phil Howard, the director of computational 
propaganda project, reinforced my view that much of 
the research on bots is dedicated to their impact in 
politics and sociology, but not enough on IR. To that 
end, I’ve begun collecting real-time data during 
particular international crises to measure anomalies in 
hashtags and fake news diffusion. My hypothesis, 
based on raw personal observation during digital crises 
was that bot-driven hashtags were more likely to 
disproportionately increase during very short periods 
(15-20 minutes) and end abruptly, without organic 
sustain. In contrast, organically-driven hashtags, 
usually increase more gradually and are sustained over 
the course of several hours, sometimes days. The first 
incident I could test this hypothesis was the Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and UAE diplomatic crisis, which began 
in June 2017, as a response to statements attributed to 
the Qatari Sheikh. A time-frequency geospatial analysis 
of the most frequently shared hashtags show us that 
the majority of anti-Qatari messaging were driven by 
bots.90 This finding was important because it was one 
of the first measureable evidence that countries use 
social media to escalate, signal and pressure other 
countries into desired behavior. By driving mass anti-
Qatar hashtags on social media Saudi Arabia and UAE 
were using a new way of diplomatically pressuring 
Qatari leadership to toe the line. A second case where 
I could further test my hypothesis was the Al Aqsa 
riots in July 2017. Measuring diffusion patterns of 
seven widest-shared hashtags, I was able to infer bot-
driven versus organically-driven messaging, giving me 
a good idea on external countries trying to influence 
foreign crises.91 This gives us good data to test and 
challenge some of the central IR hypotheses such as 
signaling, bargaining, pressuring and diversionary 
conflict theories.  
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Currently, I’m a co-principal investigator in a Turing-
funded study that aims to build an artificial-intelligence 
based conflict event detection database. The project 
combines some of the methodological perspectives 
I’ve discussed here – text mining, network analysis, 
geospatial data – to automatically harvest battlefield 
digital data in order to generate armed events and log 
them in real-time (with some redundancy-check lag, of 
course). 
 
Conclusion - How Can IR Benefit from Big Data 
and Machine Learning? 
 
Big data and computational approaches to social 
research has revolutionized social sciences and will 
inevitably impact how IR methods evolve in the 
coming decades. Two factors define the potential of 
computational research; sheer size of data that is 
extremely hard (often impossible) to process with 
conventional tools of quantitative or qualitative 
analysis and the advent of more powerful tools that 
allow us to zoom in and out of various levels of human 
behavior simultaneously. From this perspective alone, 
the big data revolution will force us to rethink a 
fundamental component of IR research: the levels of 
analysis problem. Big data gives us data granularity that 
enables micro-level approaches such as behavior, 
cognitive biases or worldview analysis, as well as the 
volume that can be scaled to meso-level (networks, 
collective action, ethno-nationalist movements) and 
macro-level (ideology, identity, systems research) 
simultaneously. When done properly, big data and 
computational tools allow us to model and understand 
human behavior much better than past approaches, 
while it is also easier to misuse and exaggerate their 
explanatory power. 
 
One of the main problems with big data research is an 
over-reliance on the processing power of the tools, 
without an eye on cultural and local differences in data. 
One very common line of dreadful mistake I 
encounter is usually in social media extremism research 
that concerns jihadi networks. When engineer or 
programmer-dominated research groups employ 
computational tools in extremism research without a 
social scientist, and/or a scholar with area and cultural 
expertise, they overwhelmingly produce faulty 
machine learning word corpus clusters. These clusters 
often confuse religious statements that express radical 
behavior with commonplace, regular cultural religious 
expressions. One computer science conference paper 
I’ve had the misfortune of reading (and won’t cite) had 
built a corpus of jihadi radical word corpus, which 
included common religious terms that Muslims use 
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everyday, such as ‘Allāhu akbar’ or ‘InShaAllah’, 
fundamentally skewing the results. Although this was 
an extreme case of tone deafness in computational 
research, there are very frequent, common and subtler 
ways of bias in research that is produced by research 
groups that aim to tackle culturally-sensitive social 
science research. Equally problematic are social 
science research clusters that aim to build machine 
learning algorithms by checking Youtube tutorials, 
without using a computer science specialist, or 
generate behavioral models without a dedicated 
modeller. Computational research reaches its true 
potential in truly multi-disciplinary research clusters 
and this is precisely why facilitator networks that 
bridge diverse sciences disciplines and establish a 
common language across them is the most urgent and 
important step universities must take in initiating 
computational research groups. 
 
That is why machine learning, as a way of enabling 
computers to build new ways of approaching evolving 
tasks, without being explicitly programmed to solve 
them, is a field that should go beyond computer 
science and needs the attention of social scientists. 
Since we can (and in the near future, will) build 
machine learning algorithms to track the extent of 
nationalist sentiment in multiple countries, explore 
real-time public opinion during an international crisis, 
or how armed or non-armed non-state actors behave 
during a violent conflict, the topic doesn’t fall far off 
of the radar of international relations. Not only should 
future IR doctoral students and early career academics 
will encounter issues related to big data, computational 
social science and machine learning, some of them will 
have to build a foundation in reading and 
understanding how algorithms work and how to 
communicate with computer scientists for 
collaborative research. This means that IR PhDs will 
have to learn Python or R as a foundational 
programming language, and add a second software 
(like ArcGis, Gephi, LingPipe, Ontotext) that fits their 
immediate research needs. 
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